


2019 - REPORT ON

GOOD PRACTICES

THE NETWORK FOR
CONFLICT PREVENTION
& PEACEBUILDING



network for
**CONFLICT PREVENTION
& PEACEBUILDING**


Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
Oxfam IBIS
Danmission
Conductive Space for Peace
The Danish Center for Conflict Resolution
The Council for International Conflict Resolution (RIKO)

REPORT ON GOOD PRACTICES 2019

The Network for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (NCPBP) was established in April 2018 joining an international chorus of actors advocating for addressing violent conflicts through conflict prevention and peacebuilding. By illustrating good practices (see box 1.1: Defining good practices) on conflict prevention and peacebuilding implemented by Danish civil society organizations and partners, this report aims to contribute to ongoing efforts to strengthen the application of the sustaining peace agenda by Danish actors working in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

The Network has drawn on individual member organisations' vast experiences and expertise to conduct joint capacity building on conflict prevention and peacebuilding practices. The learnings highlighted in this report illustrate the value of having an organized platform for CSOs to share and develop best practices and work jointly on furthering Danish efforts at conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Members of the Network report having gained an improved understanding of and ability to utilise various approaches in the field.

The present report concludes with some recommendations for how Danish policy makers and Danish civil society organisations can work to further strengthen Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding.



1. OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT

Danish CSOs are significantly active in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, delivering a wide range of assistance and activities ranging across development, humanitarian and peacebuilding programming.

practice on the ground in conflict-affected countries, this conceptual shift needs to be substantiated with concrete policies and changed practices.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding is an integral part of this conceptual shift reflected in the sustaining peace agenda and the definition of conflict prevention and peacebuilding adopted by the Network with the Pathways for Peace report.

FIGURE 1: SPECTRUM OF AMBITION*



* Inspired by the *conflict sensitivity spectrum of ambition* as presented by the UK Government's Stabilization Unit in *Conflict Sensitivity Tools and Guidance* (2016)

Regardless of whether or not interventions are deliberately pursuing peacebuilding objectives, it is evident that they will impact negatively or positively on the peace and conflict contexts in which they are implemented. This holds true both in areas of open, violent conflict and in areas characterized by latent conflict. One objective of the Network and this report is to help build capacity and persuade Danish actors to move upwards on the 'spectrum of ambition' (see figure 1) and at the very minimum ensure to 'do no harm' in their interventions.

The need to take an integrated, comprehensive and long-term approach to building and sustaining peace is increasingly recognised by the international community, as reflected in the sustaining peace resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council and the General Assembly.¹ These resolutions represent a normative and conceptual shift, which is further articulated in the 2018 joint World Bank and UN 'Pathways for Peace' report.² To catalyze changes to

CONFLICT PREVENTION...

...relates to efforts aimed at avoiding violent escalation of disputes between groups of people. It aims at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of violent conflict by addressing the root causes of conflict and strengthening existing capacities to manage and transform conflict in non-violent ways.

PEACEBUILDING...

...is a long-term process to achieve sustainable peace in a society by addressing the root causes of conflict and strengthening a society's capacity to manage violent conflict in non-violent ways.

BOX 1.1: DEFINING GOOD PRACTICES

The choice to present 'good practices' rather than 'best practices' is rooted in the recognition that there is no such thing as universally applicable 'best practices'. 'Good practices' are responsive to the given context in which they are implemented, and must therefore be designed based on a nuanced understanding of the given peace and conflict context, obtained through thorough analysis. While 'good practices' cannot be indiscriminately replicated across different contexts at different points in time, essential learnings can be drawn from them, which can serve as inspiration for designing approaches to other contexts that are adapted to the specific peace and conflict dynamics characterizing them.

¹ United Nations Security Council, Doc. S/RES/70/262, adopted at 7680th meeting on 27 April 2016; United Nations General Assembly, Doc. A/RES/70/262, adopted at seventieth session, agenda items 15 and 116, 27 April 2016.

² United Nations and the World Bank Group, 2018, Pathways for Peace. Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, (available at <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337>).

2. POLICY & PRACTICE

By illustrating good practices on conflict prevention and peacebuilding implemented by Danish civil society organizations and partners (see box 1.1), this report aims to contribute to ongoing efforts to strengthen the application of the sustaining peace agenda by Danish actors working in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

The report is based on joint exploration by Danish civil society organisations of how to integrate and strengthen conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in their work. This has been pursued through the Network on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, launched in February 2018 and encompassing member organisations.

The report showcases a variety of good practices, implemented by Danish CSOs in Denmark and abroad, and reflects on lessons learned from joint capacity building activities hosted via the Network.

The sustaining peace agenda, introduced by the UN in 2016 and further developed in the 2018 'Pathways for Peace' report, places a renewed emphasis on the prevention of violent conflict. Rather than defining prevention as a crisis management tool to address the destructive dynamics of conflict, prevention in the sustaining peace agenda means taking a long-term, comprehensive and integrated approach to foster resilient societies through political, security, justice, social and economic measures employed before, during and after violent conflict. Importantly, it stresses that violent conflicts are not linear sequential processes, but complex and dynamic systems. Sustaining peace is the joint responsibility of multiple stakeholders in society, and the concept reaffirms the need for inclusive- and nationally owned and driven approaches.

BOX 2.1: DEFINING STABILIZATION

The term 'Stabilization' often feeds into a wider liberal peace agenda where peacebuilding is less prominent. The United States Institute for Peace defines stabilization as "ending or preventing the recurrence of violent conflict and creating the conditions for normal economic activity and nonviolent politics" (USIP, 2009). What lacks in this and often in other definitions is clarifications of how to end or prevent violent conflict, but the term has caught on in particular among military practitioners in the last decade. This is also reflected in the operationalization of the term in UN peace operations, where it has been an explicit aim in the titles of four missions.¹ Despite this, there is no clear and UN-wide interpretation of the term, leaving it up to the implementing partner to interpret the mandates. Concurrently, this has led to stabilization missions being largely caught up in more 'robust' military-oriented practices with activities like active patrolling, counter-terrorism efforts, joint operations with host state forces (like the Danish training missions in Iraq), and an emphasis on establishing security and the rule of law.

In Danish policy, the term refers to the priority for a comprehensive approach in fragile states aiming to combine civilian, economic, political, and military instruments from across relevant ministries.² Thematic priorities of the Peace and Stabilisation Fund as of 2018 are directly stabilizing efforts; preventing or countering violent extremism; conflict prevention and conflict resolution; security- and justice-sector efforts; countering transnational, organized crime and illegitimate financial flows; and strengthening maritime security.⁷ To acquire sustainability and lasting peace, it is important to emphasize the integrated and multidimensional approach combining stabilization activities with wider peacebuilding efforts - something that at least textually is integrated and reflected in the name of the Danish 'Peace and Stabilisation Fund'.

LIST OF RELEVANT DANISH STRATEGY PAPERS:

[Foreign and Security Policy Strategy \(2019-2020\)](#)

[The World 2030: Denmark's strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action](#)

[The Government's priorities for Danish Development Cooperation 2019](#)

[Guidelines for the Peace and Stabilisation Fund](#)

[Defence Agreement 2018-2023](#)

¹ Missions explicitly mentioning 'stabilization' include the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in 2014, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013, the Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010, and the Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004.

² Jessica Larsen & Christine Nissen, How to consolidate the Danish comprehensive approach. The Peace and Stabilisation Fund as 'the good example'?, DIIS, 25 October 2018.

⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, Guidelines. The Peace and Stabilisation Fund, October 2018, 7.

The sustaining peace conceptualisation is supported in other reports and agreements, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the World Humanitarian Summit, the OECD DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, the New Deal, and the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) along with the UN Secretary General's follow-up to the report,³ thus representing a widely recognized normative shift in the international arena. Through this, the field arrives at some clarity about what specific organisational policies and practices are effective at sustaining peace in diverse settings, how different local and international actors can contribute and collaborate, and how policy makers concerned with the issue can create enabling conditions for sustained and coherent implementation.

Despite the importance afforded in the sustaining peace agenda to pursuing coherent and proactive approaches that strengthen societies' inherent capacities for peace, the field still has challenges in translating the vision and objective of the agenda into policy and practice, and has to a large extent not been successful in creating an enabling framework for doing so. Challenges are still many. Among these are funding mechanisms that tend to maintain power balances in favor of international agencies in lieu of local actors, which again underpins the more powerful and fails to enable local voices to be heard; humanitarian sector silos that still exist and discourage integration and coherent programming across the HDP nexus. Thus, it

seems that implementing actors still struggle with fragmentation, competition and silo-thinking, and much work is still to be done.

Danish development cooperation policies are dominated by 'security' and 'stability' approaches informed by domestic priorities and national interest. This is evident in the policies on curbing

migration and preventing violent extremism, which are often informed by short- or medium-term state interest - like cutting off the migrant flows through Turkey or across the Mediterranean but without putting a commensurate focus on addressing the root causes of conflict and displacement (see for example the case-example in chapter 4 on strengthening the focus on climate change mitigation). Or "halting the spread of violent extremism in the Middle East"⁴ rather than focusing on enhancing sustainable measures for peace. Although sporadically mentioned in strategic documents, conflict prevention is

not systematically included in policy and strategy documents, and 'stabilization' is often the prioritized term rather than peacebuilding (see box 2.1: Defining stabilization). This also translates into Danish country programmes, out of which only a few mention conflict prevention and peacebuilding. (see list of Danish strategy papers in Box 2.1: Defining stabilization).

The lack of focus on peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Danish government strategies and funding mechanisms affects the strategies and programming of Danish civil society organizations, insofar as there is less of an emphasis on those

BOX 2.2: COST OF WAR VS. PEACE

In the Global Peace Index 2019 by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) it is estimated that violence costs the world more than \$14 trillion in 2018, or \$1,853 for every person alive. Peacebuilding expenditure was estimated to be approximately \$39,2 billion in 2018, or less than 0,3 percent of the cost of violence.¹

The Copenhagen Consensus Center found in a 2012 cost-benefit analysis that spending one dollar on preventing violent conflict before they occur can avoid conflicts damage worth about \$5, which makes conflict prevention a cost-effective use of resources.²

An earlier report from IEP, Global Peace Index 2017 also estimated the likely return on increases in peacebuilding funding, noting that the return on investment can be up to 16 times the cost of the intervention. However, in 2018 the investment in peacebuilding fell with 1% compared to 2017.³

¹ Global Peace Index 2019 accessed 30/9/19 on <http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/>

² See Armed Conflicts Assessment by J Paul Dunne (2012) accessed 30/9/29 on <https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/third-copenhagen-consensus-armed-conflict-assessment-dunne>

³ Global Peace Index 2019 accessed 30/9/19 on <http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/>

³ United Nations Secretary-General, Doc. A/72/707-S/2018/43, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and sustaining peace, seventy-second session, agenda item 65, 18 January 2018.

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, Guidelines. The Peace and Stabilisation Fund, October 2018, 4.

topics in their policy dialogue with the Danish government, and in the Danish-funded part of those organisations' programming.

However, a survey conducted among Danish CSOs in early 2018 showed that there was a broad desire for stronger technical capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding and to exchange knowledge in these areas. Likewise, there was a desire for coordination and to make possible joint action, including the cooperation and support of Danish policy makers.

Civil society organisations can seek to influence the Danish government's policy on fragile and conflict-affected countries pushing for the Government to itself pursue and in turn enable Danish organisations to pursue transformative conflict prevention and peacebuilding. As with most other countries, Danish foreign policy is heavily linked to and driven by domestic interests, which tend to be short-term and tied to the political cycle. Recent debate on climate change has shown that it is possible to shift the timeframe of public debate, and it is critical that a long-term perspective is also applied to supporting conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Civil society organisations should strive to become an even more effective partner in support of preventive efforts through knowledge generation and dissemination; through evidence-based and effective programming; through enhanced cooperation between civil society actors in framing recommendations for policy and practice; and through the ability to document that conflict prevention is a very worthwhile investment (see box 2.2: Cost of War vs. Peace).

3. LEARNINGS FROM THE NETWORK

The Network for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding was founded on the basis of a realization of the gap in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field amongst Danish CSOs and a shared desire among civil society organisations to create

a space to strengthen their work in this area. A survey conducted among Danish civil society organisations at the inception of the Network in 2018 pointed to three primary needs for Danish civil society organisations to strengthen their ability to work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding: 1) Capacity building: Stronger technical capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding; 2) Knowledge sharing and generation: Improved knowledge of what works in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and; 3) Coordination and joint action: Improved coordination of conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts in countries of operation, along with joint awareness raising of the Danish public and Danish policy makers about the importance of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Drawing on the diverse capacities of Network members, the Network has responded to these needs by providing a platform for sharing experiences, joint reflection and training on conflict prevention and peacebuilding methodologies.⁵

Feedback from Network members collected from June to August 2019 shows that members of the Network have gained an improved understanding of and ability to utilise various conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches, which has enabled them to apply these methodologies in their own work and to articulate their importance among colleagues. For example, a member wrote that the Humanitarian Mediation Training allowed her to better understand and articulate among colleagues how to utilise the approach and that it informed her own efforts to mainstream and integrate this method both as stand-alone programming, and as a method within other types of programming.

Members also reported that the opportunity to network, share information and discuss how to advance conflict prevention and peacebuilding with colleagues from other organisations has proven valuable for members to feed back into the development of organisational strategy, policy and practice. Many members indicated that broad CSO cooperation has increased their understanding of the work being carried out by other CSOs and strengthened their understanding of the work of their own CSO in these areas.

⁵ A list of Network activities since January 2018 can be found on the inside cover of the front page of this report.

Learning and sharing experiences has in turn enabled individual staff to champion the integration of peacebuilding and conflict prevention internally in their own organisations as well as vis-à-vis policy makers through exploring collaboration and identifying common priorities with other organisations. For example, a member wrote that the peer-to-peer

learning of the Network had informed choices in his own organization. These learnings illustrate the value of having an organized platform for CSOs to share and develop good practices and work jointly on furthering Danish efforts for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

4. GOOD PRACTICE CASES FROM NETWORK MEMBERS

The Network has drawn on individual member organisations’ vast experiences and expertise to conduct joint capacity building on conflict prevention and peacebuilding practices. Member organizations have shared concrete field and HQ experiences and offered trainings and capacity development to other member CSOs. Organisations have also coordinated efforts and engagement with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

This section presents eight cases demonstrating good practices on conflict prevention and peacebuilding by Danish CSOs. The cases share vital knowledge and serve as inspiration for other stakeholders, including CSOs and policy makers, interested in furthering their engagement in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding fields. Each case showcases a specific project and explains key challenges and good practices. Based on this, key recommendations are drawn from each case.

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CASE 1: Oxfam's support to peacebuilding in South Sudan

- Oxfam IBIS

Oxfam's support to locally-led peacebuilding in South Sudan follows two tracks. At the national level, Oxfam has advocated for and supported the involvement of South Sudanese civil society in the previous round of the peace negotiation process, while also actively accompanying civil society engagement in the implementation and monitoring efforts. This has included working closely with the South Sudanese Civil Society Forum to ensure that priorities and perspectives of broader civil society were channeled to the negotiation process. At sub-national level in the Western Lakes state, Oxfam IBIS has worked closely with the UN Mission in South Sudan to support community reconciliation processes bringing together conflicting communities. There has been a focus on ensuring women and young people are actively involved in these processes (as opposed to solely traditional male leaders). This has resulted in a more widely owned outcome of the process. It has also led to positive, unforeseen impacts, including reducing the number and severity of Sexual and Gender Based Violence incidents. This case study focuses on community-led reconciliation efforts which took place over the course of 2018 and 2019.

Background/Context

While in other parts of South Sudan the dominant form of conflict relates to inter-clan disputes, conflict in the Western Lakes (and in the neighbouring states which formerly made up Greater Lakes State) often occurs amongst different sections of the same clan. While such conflicts have been exacerbated by the flow of arms across the State (and South Sudan, more broadly), the current State Government has initiated a disarmament process (the 4th attempt) seen by many stakeholders to have effectively reduced violence in Rumbek and the greater part of Western Lakes State. However, limited government resources have resulted in a piecemeal approach. Disarmament has not started in Eastern Lakes, which has resulted in communities on the Western Lakes side of the border between the two

states being exposed to violence.

Such disputes are also influenced by political dimensions. The redrawing of state boundaries has been viewed by many as a key factor in renewing tensions between certain sub-clans. The new state boundaries, coupled with a recent push to relocate sub-clans to their "traditional lands", have created more rigid community perceptions regarding which land is seen to be rightfully theirs, and which land should belong to other sub-clans. This has all but eliminated the traditional custom of mutual grazing across land of different sub-clans, significantly reducing day-to-day interactions between members of different sub-clans. Similarly, many stakeholders noted that cattle camps had previously been made up of youth from multiple sub-clans. This practice no longer takes place, with each cattle camp now seen to be "protectors" of their respective sub-clans. Intra-clan violence continues to take place, characterized by low-intensity yet frequent violence, often through cattle raiding and revenge killings. Over the three days of consultations which took place, various groups of stakeholders cited between three to five incidents of cattle raiding that had taken place within the past few days. The current calm in Rumbek, and the lack of visible arms in public spaces, masks a number of conflict dynamics which undermine stability. One of the most violent intra-clan conflicts in Western Lakes concerns the Rup and Pakam communities. The Rup community occupies the Malek and Amongpiny counties, bordering the Pakam-dominated counties of Alor, Malueth and Meen, all in the western part of the Greater Lakes region.

"When the Rup and Pakam men go to fight, the entire burden of providing for the family is shifted to us women. We live in a place with no food, no medical facilities and no schools for our children," explains Mary Anywang Deng from the Rup community. Western Lakes is a region known for cattle raids and intercommunal revenge attacks. The animosity between the Rup and Pakam communities

is historically and culturally rooted and has claimed scores of lives. The single most fatal attack took place in December 2017, resulting in the death of more than 200 people. That particular clash, like many others, stemmed from the two cattle-keeping communities disputing over the ownership of grazing land.

Key Challenges and Good Practices

In an effort to support both communities in addressing outstanding grievances and to co-create concrete measures to address and prevent the recurrence of violence, a reconciliation steering committee with representatives from both conflicting communities was set up at the beginning of 2018. Since then, several unsuccessful attempts to bring the two communities into dialogue had been made, until a breakthrough in December 2018 led to a peace deal.

Key to the agreement was the fact that negotiations were very inclusive, this time involving not only local leaders but also elders, women and youth representatives and cultural leaders from both the Rup and the Pakam communities. The peace dialogue in Malek ended with the two parties agreeing on a number of measures to ensure durable intercommunal harmony, with representatives from both sides pledging to lead by example. “Let us be ambassadors of peace by mobilizing all the communities to accept peace in their hearts and spirits”, said Zeckaria Puorich Matuong, a Rup representative. Makim Dut, chief of the Alor Pakam community, cautioned against the mentality of revenge emanating from past attacks. “Holding on to the past goes against tranquility. Let us open a new page by forgiving, forgetting and co-existing as brothers and sisters,” he said.

Members of the reconciliation steering committee also noted the importance of putting an end to violence-fuelling hate messages and the culture of cattle raiding. Addressing the latter problem, one of the resolutions passed states that all raided cattle has to be returned to their rightful owners, through the respective county commissioners of the Pakam and Rup communities. The area being awash with firearms was declared another significant challenge, although a recent government-led disarm-

ment campaign seems to have yielded positive results. “The presence of guns has led the youth to fight each other, but when the government disarmed them, they had to accept peace because their power was reduced,” commented Mabor Akech, a Rup member of the reconciliation steering committee.

Key points and recommendations

Increasing intercommunal interactions is seen as a vital way of reducing tensions. To this effect, continuous visits between the two feuding communities will be organized and intermarriage encouraged. To make such movements between the areas of former foes safe and possible, it was also decided to secure the Maper-Rumbek highway, where many previous attacks and ambushes have been staged. Mary Anywang Deng is optimistic that the conflict may finally have come to an end. “This stage is very important because women will now settle in their homes and go about their lives normally,” she said. Majong Ajok, head teacher at one of the schools of the Rup community, shares Mary’s faith in intercommunal harmony to prevail. “We believe this time round will be different [as compared to other, failed dialogues] because our people have finally accepted that peace is what we need.”

CASE 2: Humanitarian Mediation Training (North Eastern Nigeria 2019)

- DRC-DDG⁶

Background/ Context

In January 2019 in Copenhagen, the Danish Refugee Council via the NCPPB Network with Global Fokus funding, organized a Humanitarian Mediation training for Danish civil society actors. Subsequently, DRC's Nigeria Armed Violence Re-

fer (CBT) selection of beneficiaries, family issues; Protection: Family disputes, community disputes, denial of rights; and WASH: managing / maintenance of sanitation facilities, chlorination and volunteer disputes. They found the humanitarian mediation and dialogue facilitation methodology useful in order to seek to address these challenges

faced when implementing their humanitarian work as well as faced by communities.

In Nigeria, DRC's AVR team, trained in mediation and dialogue facilitation, has assisted local civil society actors in facilitating dialogue between farmers and herders, based on the same approach and methodology.

DRC currently carries out similar activities with training and support in conflict management, mediation and dialogue facilitation in several countries including Afghanistan, Somalia and the Sahel.



Danish Refugee Council colleagues in Maiduguri, Eastern Nigeria during Humanitarian Mediation training, March 2019

duction (AVR)-team, with a participant from the training in Copenhagen, provided the training to colleagues within different humanitarian sectors (WASH, Shelter, Protection, Livelihoods) in Maiduguri, Northeastern Nigeria.

The training was positively received and a majority of the participants mentioned this approach as something that would be useful within their different programmatic sectors. They reported experiencing challenges in the areas of Shelter: Housing, Land and Property; Food security: Cash Based Trans-

Key Challenges and Good Practices

Humanitarian mediation is a tool that can allow humanitarian actors to seek to prevent violence on civilians and thereby provide protection or facilitate access, as such it can contribute to reducing tensions, preventing and managing conflicts in humanitarian settings;

The process is inclusive bringing all affected voices to the table;

⁶ Danish Demining Group (DDG) is a specialised unit within DRC

Key points and recommendations

Participants in the humanitarian mediation training in Copenhagen in January 2019 mentioned:

- ▶ The tools presented during the training are useful in humanitarian work
- ▶ Useful for the individuals in carrying out their work
- ▶ Usefulness of humanitarian mediation as a tool in addressing conflicts/issues within different humanitarian sectors and settings



The trainer, Helen Balami, from Nigeria who participated in and co-facilitated the Humanitarian Mediation training in Copenhagen

CASE 3: Conflict Sensitive Communication in the Sahel

- DRC-DDG/IMS Sahel

Background/ Context

In the efforts of preventing conflicts it is important to include the local media and other key local communication channels and actors. It is well known that local media can play a role as a connector as well as a divider. Language and managing information and rumours also play a role by contributing to reducing or increasing tensions.



In the Sahel, DRC-DDG and International Media Support (IMS) have collaborated to learn from each other's expertise on human security and conflict sensitive communication and journalism. This has allowed DRC-DDG to get a closer collaboration with community radios and contributing to conflict sensitive communication in DRC-DDG's Border Security and Management Programme, covering border areas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

DRC-DDG participated in IMS trainings to train community radio hosts from the 3 countries. Representatives from 10 community radios and their listening club members participated in several trainings.

The 10 radios were as follows:

- ▶ Niger: Radio Soudji (Ayorou), Radio Liptako (Téra) and Radio Gomni Alher (Bankilaré)
- ▶ Burkina Faso: Radio Municipale de Dori, Radio communautaire Daande Yaali de Sebba and Radio Walde Ejef de Gorom Gorom
- ▶ Mali: Radio Soni (Ansongo), Radio Alafia (Ansongo), Radio Naata (Gao) and Radio Anniya (Gao).

DRC-DDG contributed by presenting experiences from Border Security and Management programming with a focus on human security and community safety in border areas.

IMS in turn contributed to the training of 20 DRC-DDG field staff on conflict sensitive communication and how to work with community radios. Following this training, DRC-DDG staff developed key messages aimed at creating awareness

among local and community radios of conflict sensitive communication.

The trainings furthermore allowed for an exchange between the two organisations, their staff and the local community radio representatives on different aspects of programming as well as opportunities for closer collaboration.

Good Practices

- ▶ Map local media and communication stakeholders
- ▶ Include, exchange with and learn from local

media and other key communication channels and actors in conflict prevention programming

- ▶ Promote conflict sensitive communication and participatory community engagement approaches with local actors, including local media
- ▶ Create a space for exchange between local media and authorities and security providers

Key points and recommendations

- ▶ The more systematic relation-building between community radios and community safety activities had been a missing link in previous programming which was useful and necessary to include
- ▶ Added value of collaboration and joint programming between complementary areas of expertise in a given region, and how Danish organizations can increase such partnerships

CASE 4: Conflict resolution in Ukraine - from training to change

- CfK

Background/ Context

Due to the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the country experiences a high number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Ukrainian Red Cross (URCS) is assisting the IDPs with psychosocial and limited material support in their new areas of settlement. Many IDPs are traumatised by the conflict, desperate due to their difficult life situation and not always content with the support they get from the government and URCS. Conflicts arise between the IDPs and URCS volunteers who are often young and relatively inexperienced, and between locals and the IDPs. Additionally, the volunteers at times experience conflicts in their own teams about decision-making, prioritisation of support-activities etc. As a result, Danish and Ukrainian Red Cross contacted the Danish Centre for Conflict Resolution (DCCR) in order to improve the conflict resolution skills of the volunteers.

The initial approach taken was simply to train groups of volunteers for four days in conflict resolution and then leave them to implement the new knowledge. The content was developed in close dialogue between Red Cross and DCCR, and it included two overall subjects. Firstly, “understanding and analysing conflicts” which entailed subjects such as identifying the key components of conflicts, understanding how conflicts escalate, understanding your own and other people’s reactions in conflict, and learn how to avoid doing harm (unwillingly enhancing conflicts) when intervening in a conflict zone. Secondly, “dealing with interpersonal conflict” which encompassed a) how to communicate in order to prevent or deescalate conflicts via mirroring, active listening and Non-violent Communication, and b) how to facilitate inclusive decision-making processes. A substantial number of volunteers from different regions were trained in these subjects over a three-year period.

Key Challenges and Good Practices

Both during and after each course the training content and didactics were evaluated and improved in order to better meet the participants’ needs and level of competences. Evaluations were highly positive regarding relevance and quality of the training. However, it became clear that many participants found it extraordinarily difficult to practise the tool “Nonviolent Communication”, which was a central element in the course. Through a dialogue between participants, Red Cross and the trainers, a culturally rooted learning barrier was identified: The historically very hierarchical structure of Ukrainian political and family life clashed



with a very dialogical and non-hierarchical communication tool. It was hard for many participants to abandon the existing rather confrontational and argument-based way of communicating and substitute it with a very empathic and question-centred way of communicating. To minimise this challenge, it was decided to simplify the tool somewhat, to boost the trainers' demonstration of how to use the tool, to increase the time spent on the subject, and to make the clash of approaches more explicit.

Another equally important outcome of the ongoing course evaluation was a realisation that the initial approach with its sole focus on training was too narrow in order to create sustainable change. It became clear that the participants found it difficult to continue to use and to deepen their new skills after the trainings - as is the case in many training projects. Therefore, regional and national URCS coordinators were assigned to help the volunteers keep the new skills alive by facilitating the practising of skills both in the field with the IDPs and during internal Red Cross meetings. They became a kind of ambassadors for the project.

Furthermore, to avoid an everlasting dependency on foreign (expensive) trainers local conflict resolution experts were identified and trained to take over the training and to supplement the coordinators assistance with occasional supervision of volunteers. The local trainers were introduced to the training via oral orientations and reading of relevant material, but they also contributed with new ideas to the didactics of the trainings. More importantly, they participated during one of the four days of trainings mainly as observers and as assistant facilitators during group exercises in order to prepare themselves for "the take-over." During a second volunteers training, the Danish trainer took the observer role and the local trainers took the role as trainers under the supervision of the Danish trainer. Breaks and evenings were used for feedback sessions between the trainers. In order for the phasing-in of local trainers to become a success a comprehensive training manual or road map including slides, explanations of the trainers' role and how to facilitate presentations, dialogues, reflections and exercises were developed. Finally, a programme and methodology for the local trainers' supervision of the volunteers' conflict resolution practises were developed. Today, the local

trainers are successfully continuing the trainings and supervision in close cooperation with URCS, and positive feedback is received from many volunteers. URCS is also considering initiating a new department focusing on humanitarian education for the general public, which includes conflict resolution skills with Nonviolent Communication as a key element.

Key points and recommendations

For the project to fully impact the work of the volunteers and eventually the IDPs and their neighbours more can definitely be done – had resources been available. This would include closer supervision of the volunteers' conflict resolution activities including both their "do-no-harm" analyses, which are to be undertaken before interventions in an area, and their interpersonal communicative efforts. Furthermore, identification of more participatory and demand-driven approaches to URCS' IDP related activities could probably be helpful in order to minimise conflicts between volunteers and IDPs and other.

In summary, for a more professional culture of conflict resolution to emerge in and around the work of URCS volunteers training (executed by external experts) is inadequate. Firstly, the training content and didactics have to be adapted to or rooted in the local culture and not copy-pasted from a Western context. Secondly, relatively close follow-up supervision of the participants is a prerequisite for a successful outcome, which equals changed conflict behaviour and not just new knowledge. Thirdly, it is important to work not only on an interpersonal level (improved communication and understanding) but also on an organisational level (here: a more demand-driven approach to IDP related activities) to transform the conflicts "on the ground." Fourthly, sustainability can be achieved if local "ambassadors" and conflict resolution experts – in good time – are assisted to take over and deepen the work started by external experts.

CASE 5: Taadudiya

- *Danmission*

Background/ Context

Media platform “Taadudiya” (meaning Pluralism in Arabic)

Adyan, a faith-based organisation in the Middle East, in collaboration with Danmission, a Danish faith-based NGO, launched a website in the beginning of 2017 that works on fostering the culture of accepting difference and valuing diversity with the aim of ensuring positive interaction, social cohesion and peaceful coexistence between the different components of society. This is done through a variety of online approaches one of them being linking public life values, such as justice, solidarity etc. with faith-based perspectives through online articles written by recognised Islamic scholars. This has tapped into a gap and a need among Arab youth, who in general is used to know about these issues from traditional religious leaders who talk about religious social issues from a sectarian perspective. So far more than 1,6 million young people have engaged on 51 articles by either commenting, liking and/or sharing the articles which is just a part of a bigger online community which includes Facebook.

Social media gap on the issue of Religious Social Responsibility

According to Adyan’s editorial policy of “Taadudiya”, the platform and its writers work on: First, providing the readers with a content that stimulates critical thinking, fosters religious freedom and honours religious, cultural and ethnic diversity. Second, disseminating knowledge on the religious and cultural heritage worldwide and in the Arab world specifically. Third, monitoring of the situation of living together locally, regionally and globally, and promoting models of youth and experts working on pluralism and on solidarity. The content is in Arabic and varied between text, photos and videos, in addition to an interactive space for the readers to share their opinion and raise a debate about several issues presented by the writers which contributes to the enhancement of pluralistic thinking in Arab societies.

The articles are written by the members of the network, Religious Social Responsibility for Citizenship and Coexistence (RSRC) consisting of nine high-level Islamic scholars. The network works collectively on a Companion, an academic guide focusing on nine public life values based on faith-based perspectives. The Companion seeks to bridge the gap of how Islamic higher institutes can tackle and communicate public life values based on faith-based perspectives.

The work was initiated due to prominent Islamic authorities issuing declarations, e.g. the Al-Azhar declaration on citizenship and coexistence in 2017, and the Marrakesh declaration on the status of minorities in Muslim majority countries in 2016. However, although these documents are highly significant in Muslim societies, the institutes of Islamic high learning (in Arab countries) do not have the resources to translate and implement such understandings into their curricula and include this new kind of religious interpretation in teaching.

The Companion serves the purpose of bridging this gap and aid teachers in Islamic higher institutes to tackle and communicate the messages of the declarations throughout the MENA region. By utilizing this content through an online platform, the dissemination of the project objectives and long-term goal has been highly overachieved and serves as a good example of how to integrate the use of social media into the design of the programmatic work to ensure greater outreach.

The impact

The reach of the platform content posted on social media was in February 2019 more than 30 million people from the different Arab countries, aged between 25 and 34 and with a ratio of 35% women and 65% men.

Learn more: www.taadudiya.com/

CASE 6: Incorporating climate change perspectives in conflict prevention & peacebuilding

- RIKO

Background/ Context

Incorporating climate change perspectives in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in fragile states is becoming increasingly important. While the relationship between climate change and violent conflict is complex and not linear, it is becoming more and more clear that climate change plays an increasing

role as a stressfactor, that can increase the fragility of a society and possibly the likelihood of conflict. For example, extreme weather events may increase food insecurity which in turn may affect the livelihood of vulnerable households in fragile communities. At the same time, a society entrenched in violent conflict is less prepared to mitigate or adapt to climate change.




Solomon Islands is experiencing some of the highest rates of searise globally, forcing whole island communities to migrate to larger mainland islands (Copyright RIKO 2019)

Environmental changes and their effects on violent conflict and consequent displacement flows are not new, but climate change in the proportion we are witnessing and will experience in the future is. It has become increasingly questionable whether global warming can be limited to the level below 2 degrees. Aside from already causing climatic changes, the increase in temperature can accelerate change we cannot predict. For example, IPCC among others predict that climate change and its consequences will be the biggest driver of forced displacement globally in 2050. This makes it necessary not only to prevent further climate change, but also to adapt to unavoidable climate change.

Policy makers, especially those in countries already affected by climate change, are urgently aware of the risks posed by the relation between climate change and violent conflict. In March 2019, in an article on the World Economic Forum, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh wrote that “climatic stress [causes] tensions to simmer and [sparks] different forms of conflicts within communities”. Political leaders of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have similarly been driving the agenda for an increased focus on how climate change impacts livelihoods and societies.⁷ The climate security

⁷ Justin Worland, “The Leaders of These Sinking Countries Are Fighting to Stop Climate Change. Here’s What the Rest of the World Can Learn”, TIME, June 13, 2019; Planetary Security Initiative, Fighting an existential threat: Policy Brief small island states bringing climate change to the UN Security Council, March 2018.

⁸ UN Security Council, Res. 2349, 31 March 2017, para. 26; Swedish MFA, “Climate change impacts on security - now the UN must act”, 13. juli 2018; Swedish MFA, Programme for Sweden’s Membership of the United Nations Security Council 2017-2018, 2016.



In northern Kenya, the pastoralist tribes have experienced increasing severe droughts recent years, forcing them to migrate further with their livestock. This is increasing risks of violent clashes among tribes, as they fight for diminishing water and pasture resources (copyright RIKO 2019)

agenda made it to the UN Security Council, where Sweden drove the agenda as a member in the 2017-2018 term.⁸ Some countries and their development cooperation agencies, particularly Germany (GIZ) and Sweden (Sida), have been working on the relationship between climate change and security and/or conflict for many years. In Danish foreign policy, a new focus on climate, conflict and migration in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa begins in 2020.⁹

RIKO has recently embarked on a project aiming to, on the one hand, gather existing knowledge on the relationship between climate change, violent conflict and migration and on the other, to explore the potential nexus by engaging with people affected by climate change and/or violent conflict and/or migration in Bangladesh, Kenya and the Solomon Islands. The first step of the project has been to start mapping the state of knowledge in the field. This has been conducted partly as desk research and partly informed by engagements in case countries. The second stage, involves collecting personal stories from case countries. A third step will be to seek to enhance knowledge on the relationship between climate change and violent conflict amongst Danish CSOs and policy makers. Danish CSOs and Danish development cooperation already engage in settings affected by climate change and violent conflict. The objective is to contribute to having improved impact through more effective, integrated programs that seek to mitigate the causes of violent conflict as well as build climate change adaptation capacities.

Key Challenges and Good Practices

► Identifying the indirect effects of climate change on conflict

The relationship between climate change and violent conflict is complex and caution must be taken when trying to identify the indirect effects of climate change on conflict. Climate change can be a threat multiplier in violent conflict. As climate change can result in unfavorable environmental conditions, it in turn can undermine living conditions and livelihoods, increase socio-economic differences, and generally serve to increase poverty in the affected areas. These variables might impact on societal fragility, potentially reinforce social and political tensions between communities and/or risk aggravating existing conflicts or create potential for new ones. This indicates an indirect relationship between climate change and conflict. At the same time, however, it is important not to ascribe climate change the responsibility for conflict and crisis as conflict always has a multitude of interlinked causes.

► Climate change leads to forced displacement

Climate change will cause disasters and at the same time slowly make large areas of the earth uninhabitable. This will potentially lead to mass forced displacement. Some predictions place the number of forcefully displaced persons due to climate-rela-

ted disasters at 200 million.¹⁰ Climate change can stress environments, livelihoods, and living conditions and exacerbate complex social, economic and environmental factors that can, if nothing else is done, lead to forced displacements of communities or entire populations. Studies show that already vulnerable communities and populations are most at risk of being forcibly displaced by climate change-related factors.¹¹ At the moment, most persons are internally displaced (ie. within their own country) and this trend is likely to continue.¹²

► **Fragile and conflict affected states are more vulnerable to climate change**

Fragile and conflict-affected societies will be severely challenged in responding to climate change. There are various epicenters already at risk of hard impact from climate change. Particularly so in low-lying coastal areas and in the cyclone belt, on small islands in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, and in drought areas in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. In some of these regions, climate change already constitutes a multiplying factor in conflict and in the onset of forced displacement.

Key points and recommendations

► **Knowledge-generation and sharing on climate sensitivity**

There is a need for systematic generation and sharing of knowledge to better understand the nexus between climate change, conflict and migration. Particularly so in order to integrate climate change perspective (climate sensitivity) in conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions. What is needed is research and specific case studies to deepen our understanding of how climate change affects violent conflict, and on effective strategies to programme around this. Importantly, this requires an increase in the allocation of resources. It is a step forward that the political agreement of November 6th, 2019 opens up for funding for research on

international conflicts induced by climate change. However, the Danish Government should work for a more permanent and sustainable research solution, such as a center focusing on climate change and conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding.

Additionally, knowledge generation in the nexus particularly includes supporting existing databases such as The World Bank index on fragile and conflict affected situations, the INFORM Index for Risk Management as well as ensuring their usage feed into conflict and risk assessments as well as programming. Finally, knowledge must be shared between all relevant actors in Denmark.

► **Climate sensitizing conflict prevention and peacebuilding**

Implementing actors need to recognize the increasing impact of climate change as a dynamic and stress factor in their humanitarian, development, and/or peacebuilding work. Accordingly, climate risk should be integrated into conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies and programming. This includes knowledge on how to leverage climate change mitigation and adaptation measures to prevent conflict and build sustainable peace simultaneously. For example, conflict analyses as well as preventive early warning systems should include climate risk and resilience factors.

To find out what works has several dimensions. First, better understanding requires specific case-based research in the climate change and conflict nexus (rf. above). Then, the understanding must feed into policy and programming and finally, integrated programming must be tested and its effects documented. Both generation and sharing of knowledge must be undertaken and/or supported by several Danish actors, including academia, civil society, relevant units in the MFA and Danish development cooperation. Analyses conducted by German and Swedish development cooperation agencies on climate, security and conflict¹³ should provide inspiration for Danish development coope-

¹⁰ International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, IOM Migration Research Series no. 31, 2008.

¹¹ Webersik, Christian, 2012, Climate-induced migration and conflict: What are the links? in Climate Change and Human Mobility, Global Challenges to the Social Sciences; Birk, Thomas, Relocation of reef and atoll island communities as an adaptation to climate change: learning from experience in Solomon Islands, 2012.

¹² Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Report on Internal Displacement, 2019.

¹³ GTZ, Climate Change and Security. Challenges for German Development Cooperation, April 2008; Sida, Working Paper 2017. The relationship between climate change and violent conflict, 2018.

ration. Importantly, good practices need to be shared among actors and across sectors.

► **Planning for climate displacement and protecting displaced persons**

The mass type of forced displacement due to climate change calls for preventive strategies working with disaster risk reduction and adaptation to climate change along with measures protecting people who are or will be forcefully displaced. This calls on humanitarian and development actors, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private sector actors to work within and support the emerging prevention and protection policy agenda, notably the Agenda for Humanity.

The Danish Government should work within and support the series of instruments that together provide the laws that protect people and enhance cooperation in response to climate related displacement. While there is no single international treaty that governs climate-related displacement, there are legal agreements designed to enhance the prevention of climate related displacement, and to protect people who are forced to move.¹⁴ All instruments have at their core the fundamental obligations owed under human rights law.

¹⁰ Relevant instrument include: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Agenda for Humanity Grand Bargain, European Convention on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Global Compact on Refugees, Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (for situations where climate displacement and armed conflict coincide), Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (noting in particular that articles 6 and 7 are the traditional legal basis for complementary protection under the customary international law principle of *non-refoulement*), International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disaster, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nansen Initiative Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. The list is not exhaustive but includes key instruments that RIKO has identified as important in the multitude of contexts within which climate displacement occurs. All instruments have at their core the fundamental obligations owed under human rights law.

CASE 7: Local Agency and Power in Peacebuilding – Doing Peace Differently

- CSP

Background/ Context

Peacebuilding is needed more than ever. As the number and gravity of violent conflicts is increasing and a high percentage of armed conflicts are recurring even after peace agreements have been signed, there is an urgent need to recognise that the global peacebuilding system is not working as well as it could in supporting the key actors in peacebuilding: the local peacebuilders. At the heart of effective and sustainable peacebuilding lies the power of local actors to build peace – with the knowledge, innovative approaches, persistent and long-term engagement, and convening power necessary to build sustainable peace. Although the effectiveness of local peacebuilding is well documented (including by Autesserre, Firkow, and Peace Direct), it has not led to the necessary shift in power and change in the way of working of international institutions.

While UN Secretary General Guterres is leading the agenda for sustainable peace, there is a long way to go in creating a conducive space for local actors to lead effective peacebuilding processes. There is a need to transform the global peacebuilding (and development) system to be led by local actors. A different type of collaboration for more sustainable peacebuilding is needed. Therefore, Conducive Space for Peace (CSP) works as a catalyst to transform the global peacebuilding system and create a more enabling space for local leadership in peacebuilding.

CSP has since its inception in 2016 linked change agents and efforts strategically in order to build momentum for change, support change agents in leveraging change, and catalysing collective innovative efforts for change. In April 2019, CSP and Humanity United co-hosted a meeting in New York that brought together 35 thought and practice leaders from local and international peacebuilding organisations, UN agencies, universities and think tanks. The goal of the meeting was to

bring together all relevant UN organisations with the international peacebuilding community and local peacebuilders, with an ambition to strengthen local agency and power in peacebuilding and explore avenues for learning and joint/complimentary action to move the change process forward together.

Key Challenges and Good Practices

A number of key challenges in supporting and enabling local agency and power were identified among the participants during the two-day meeting, including:

► Geopolitical change

Today the world is seeing radical geopolitical change, erosion of the rules-based international order, and shifts in global governance and collaboration. This is affecting political support to peacebuilding including changing geographic priorities, imposing additional demands for upward accountability, and a recourse to ‘power politics’ with shrinking space for NGOs in peacebuilding.

► Donor driven peacebuilding and incentive structures

The international peacebuilding system is currently dominated by international institutions such as bilateral donors, UN agencies, and INGOs who draws their organisational ‘logic’ from donor priorities, donor constituencies and donor bureaucracies. This creates challenges in the way of working with particularly grave consequences for the collaboration between international and local actors with a lack of local ownership in programming, and the degree to which local actors can lead the peacebuilding work that they consider most effective and in the way that they consider it done most effectively. Peacebuilding is often guided by foreign

policy and trade agendas with institutions that are set-up to be more accountable to the global. This, along with a general priority of compliance and a predominant risk aversion embedded throughout the system, is difficult to reconcile with locally led processes and accountability towards the local.

▶ **Inherent power inequalities**

A lack of recognition of the knowledge of local actors embodies the challenges in the system as both cause and consequence. Technical knowledge of international peacebuilders overrides the local contextual knowledge of those who live the conflict and have worked all their lives to develop a peaceful society. This is a ‘professionalisation’ of international peacebuilding, which asserts the superiority of international staff over local staff. The success of local organisations is largely rated as the ability to mirror donor preferences rather than the ability to identify challenges and suggest how to address these based on contextual knowledge. There is a rhetoric of trust but a clear absence of reciprocity within the relationships between donors/international organisations and local actors.

▶ **Inertia in the system:** International institutions may feel threatened by the power shifts necessary to change the system. The challenges are largely considered unchangeable and irreversible, or they are addressed through piecemeal measures that ultimately prove futile. This creates inherent inertia, resistance and to some degree arrogance

in the system where it becomes more a matter of securing jobs and institutional survival than real change and impact on the ground.

The questions that participants explored together revolved around how to facilitate systems change:

▶ **Building momentum**

The timing for change is good now because people recognize that things haven’t worked for a while, which makes them more open to explore other ways of building peace. Leadership matters for systemic change and it takes transformational leadership to change organisational culture and ways of working. Ultimately, we all have to work within our system(s).

▶ **Supporting change agents**

There is a need to create spaces for the change agents who can institute new practices centred on local agency and power. There are opportunities in supporting people within institutions who understand these challenges and who are willing to bend or break some rules. We must scale up our work with change agents – connectors, risk-takers, rule-breakers – and help them operate in ‘tight spaces’.

▶ **Engaging in joint action for change:** Argue for a shift away from projectisation, changing the

programme focus to a people focus, changing the language that we use, re-balance the role of local and thematic knowledge, changing recruitment practices and flip accountability from capitals to countries to prioritising local accountability. We need to reframe risk as something we hold together, and we need a new understanding and practice of reciprocity. We need to help donors and international institutions create space for local ownership – this means suggesting alternatives, facilitating processes for change, exchanging experiences and sharing best practices.



Key points and recommendations

The two days of discussion showed that we should not take for granted that we can easily talk about the challenges of the current international system including its power imbalances without meeting resistance and barriers to change. We have to think hard about how best to influence this change agenda and how to communicate to facilitate change. As participants said: “we must

empower one another to change ourselves and our organisations, and empower one another to facilitate broader systems change. These two levels of change are connected. We need to be artists, visionaries and change makers wherever we are in the system. We must pursue this change process, considering what should happen today if we are to change the system tomorrow, and how we each can contribute to this change.”

Although, CSP is a small Danish NGO, it holds the convening power to bring together key stakeholders within the peacebuilding field to strategize how to ‘do peace differently’ and link this discussion to innovative systems thinkers and to the ‘doing-development-differently’ (DDD) change agenda. As Gatwal A. Gatkouh shared after the meeting in April:

“Thank you so much for creating this platform. It’s a pragmatic and practical space and I have no doubts the positive change we collectively seek to see in the peacebuilding industry shall materialize. The meeting had changed my perspective on synergies building and collaborations. Now, I must acknowledge that I have completely a different outlook after the meeting. Thank you for being such a voice and a leader especially at critical moments when the agenda for sustainable and positive change need to be walked rather than only talked.” (Gatwal A. Gatkouh, South Sudan and Uganda)

Other activities organised by CSP include a meeting among UN Peace and Development Advisers in West Africa (held in Senegal) and an Accelerator workshop in Geneva bringing together teams from Syria, South Sudan, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Mali. Read more at conducivespace.org.



5. KEY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the individual cases presented above provide more contextual and subject-specific takeaway points and recommendations, this conclusion focuses on overarching observations and key recommendations to further strengthen Danish engagement in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, drawing on lessons identified by the Network since its inception.

► Conclusion 1

The establishment of the Network for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, has responded well to the need for a framework for Danish CSOs (and policymakers) to exchange learning, knowledge and skills for improved capacity to work on these subjects.

The sustaining peace agenda has underlined the need for taking a long-term, comprehensive and integrated approach to fostering resilient societies through political, security, justice, social and economic measures employed before, during and after violent conflict. This need is increasingly recognised by the international community, as well as in Denmark by both the CSO-community and policymakers. However, a framework was needed to build knowledge and capacity to implement this agenda in order to arrive at clarity about which specific organisational policies and practices are effective at sustaining peace in diverse settings, how different local and international actors can contribute and collaborate, and how policy makers concerned with the issue can create enabling conditions for sustained and coherent implementation.

Since its inception, it is clear that the Network has: established a capacity building framework/setting for Danish CSOs to engage in; inspired and built capacity in Danish CSOs to incorporate conflict prevention and peacebuilding in their programming; identified knowledge and practice-gaps for future capacity building needs relating to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Danish CSOs; and raised awareness about and identified shortfalls and opportunities for strengthening the Danish

foreign and development policy focus in relation to a strengthened focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

► Conclusion 2

There are still knowledge and practice gaps on how Danish CSOs can implement conflict prevention and peacebuilding in programming, working across sector silos and enhancing collaboration between organizations.

Danish civil society organisations have expressed three primary needs in order to strengthen their ability to work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding: 1) Capacity building: Stronger technical capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding; 2) Knowledge sharing and generation: Improved knowledge of what works in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and; 3) Coordination and joint action: Improved coordination of conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts in countries of operation, along with joint awareness raising of the Danish public and Danish policy makers about the importance of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

► Conclusion 3

Foreign and development policies framed and designed according to a stabilization approach tend to focus on short-term stability and statebuilding, while largely failing to address the complex factors continuing to drive violent conflict at multiple levels and dimensions in societies.

Ensuring stability is not in itself sufficient to foster sustainable peace in conflict-affected and fragile societies and contributes little towards preventing recurring conflict. Channeling resources towards prevention of conflict and building sustainable peace is widely known to be a cost-effective and worthwhile investment. The Global Peace Index in 2017 noted that peacebuilding expenditure was estimated to be approximately \$10 billion, representing less than one per cent of the cost of war

that year. The GPI report also estimated that the return on investment in peacebuilding could be up to 16 times the cost of the intervention, highlighting a major opportunity for future investment. The above cases have demonstrated the wide range of initiatives of conflict prevention and peacebuilding taken by Danish civil society organisations. Danish civil society organisations hold strong capacities within this field but also face a number of challenges, demanding increased opportunities for capacity building and knowledge generation, as well as a more conducive policy space to strengthen such efforts.

The Network has identified key next steps, including a strengthened focus on WPS (Women, Peace and Security) and HDP (humanitarian-development-peace nexus) opportunities and risks, improved (cross-sector) staff learning and disseminating knowledge and practical examples. These will constitute core focus areas for the Network in 2020.

The following structural level recommendations for civil society organisations and Danish policy makers aim to promote Danish efforts to sustain peace:

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DANISH POLICY MAKERS:

► **Structurally include conflict prevention and peacebuilding**

Expand the foreign policy agenda from a focus on stabilization to include measures that explicitly contribute to addressing the structural causes of conflict, including through a greater focus on supporting specific conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts as well as creating an enabling environment for civil society organisations

► **Work with civil society for long-term initiatives**

Engage civil society actors - including local voices - in defining the sort of long-term initiatives that may enable sustainable peace, and support such initiatives with flexible long-term funding, including crisis modifiers where the context so dictates.

► **Promote cooperative programming**

Promote better cross-sector, cross-organizational and north/south programming and implementation of development initiatives that sustain joint efforts and a knowledge sharing culture.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DANISH NGO COMMUNITY:

► **Enhance structures for cooperation**

Enhance structures for cooperation between all civil society actors including local voices to ensure greater impact when framing recommendations for policy and practice in relation to conflict prevention and peacebuilding

► **Show impact of conflict prevention**

Work with policy makers to strengthen the ability to document that conflict prevention is a very worthwhile investment

► **Secure and share good practices**

Secure knowledge about evidence-based and effective programming within conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including identifying and further developing good practices in specific contexts.

► **Ensure any humanitarian or development initiative is informed by regular gender and conflict analysis**

This is critical to ensuring any engagement does not make things worse - even if it does not explicitly seek to contribute to conflict prevention or peacebuilding outcomes. It also creates opportunities to find ways that humanitarian and development efforts can contribute to enhancing social cohesion, or helping to address either the structural or proximate causes of conflict.



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